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ABSTRACT: This article reconstructs the history and the polemics surrounding an operation of dismissals of the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom’s [CCF] local representatives in Latin America carried out between 1961 and 1964. 
The operation was a consequence of adoption of the new guidelines -“Opening to the Left”- implemented as a basis 
of the new Latin American program in response to the Cuban Revolution by the CCF’s executives. The process of 
dismissals in the local Committees dismantled the original Latin American program of the CCF and affected mainly 
representatives proceeding from the Spanish exile diaspora. In fact, the operation became a culmination of a process 
of marginalization of the Spanish exiles within the CCF structures. The study highlights the CCF’s politics of limit-
ing of the personal political and cultural agendas of those of its employees who entered into collision with the Con-
gress’s general ideological changing strategies. 
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RESUMEN: Despidos de los representantes del Congreso por la Libertad de la Cultura en América Latina como 
parte de la estrategia de «Apertura a la Izquierda» (1961-1964).- Este artículo reconstruye la historia y la polémica 
en torno a una operación de despidos de los representantes locales del Congreso por la Libertad de la Cultura [CLC] 
en América Latina realizada entre 1961 y 1964. La operación fue consecuencia de la adopción de las nuevas directri-
ces -«Apertura a la Izquierda»- implementadas como base del nuevo programa latinoamericano en respuesta a la 
Revolución Cubana por parte de los ejecutivos del CLC. El proceso de despidos en los comités locales de América 
Latina desmanteló el programa latinoamericano original del CLC y afectó principalmente a los representantes proce-
dentes del exilio español. De hecho, la operación se convirtió en la culminación de un proceso de marginación de los 
exiliados españoles dentro de las estructuras del CLC. El estudio destaca la política del CCF de limitar las agendas 
políticas y culturales personales de aquéllos de sus empleados que entraron en colisión con las cambiantes estrate-
gias ideológicas generales del Congreso. 
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The cultural cold war in Latin America is a field ex-
plored with ever-growing interest by historians. However, 
problems with the periodization and the terminology, 
along with issues regarding methodological frameworks, 
continue to challenge the scientific community (Calandra 
and Franco, 2012: 9-32; Niño and Montero, 2012). In the 
cultural and intellectual realm, the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom [CCF] (1950-1967), an international association 
which brought together dozens of prestigious intellectuals 
in the postwar period, was the most important US and 
Western covert endeavour in the battle of ideas. During 
the Cold War, it was also a fundamental organisation de-
voted to the defence of individual liberties and the anti-
totalitarian cause (Coleman, 1989; Grémion, 1995; 
Mudrovcic, 1997; Hochgeschwender: 1998; Saunders, 
2001; Scott-Smith, 2002; Wilford, 2003, 2008). The CCF 
was funded by American private foundations such as 
Ford and Rockefeller and also by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) which used private foundations as a cover 
(e.g. Fairfield). Apart from the early doctoral thesis of 
Russell Cobb (2007), with regard to the Latin American 
context, in recent years two monographs, both resulting 
from doctoral research and including unpublished sources, 
addressed the work of the Congress for Cultural Freedom 
on the continent (Glondys, 2012; Iber, 2015). Olga 
Glondys focused on the intellectual community gathered 
around the CCF’s journal, Cuadernos del Congreso por 
la Libertad de la Cultura (1953-1965), and analysed the 
ideological transformations of the Latin American pro-
gram, reflected on the problem of its weaknesses, and 
highlighted the Spanish exiles’ contribution. Patrick Iber’s 
book offered a general approximation reflecting on all 
major aspects of the Cultural Cold War in Latin America, 
dealing especially with the cases of Mexico and Cuba 
(Casa de las Américas), and pairing his research on the 
CCF with the analysis of the Peace offensive led by the 
Soviet Union. 
The CCF carried out most of its activity in Latin 
America with the decisive involvement of Spanish Re-
publican exiles, both in the design of the local program 
and in the composition of its leadership structures. The 
Spanish political émigrés, since 1939 interlinked by 
means of trans-American cultural, political and academic 
networks, were fundamental for the CCF’s purposes 
when it came to implementing its agenda, with its simul-
taneous local, national and transnational approach. The 
main trusted figure of the CCF on the continent was Ju-
lián Gorkin, a former leader of a small Catalan quasi-
Trotskyist party Partit Obrer d’Unificació Marxista 
[POUM]. Throughout the 1950s Gorkin was head of the 
Latin American Secretariat and responsible for appoint-
ments in the local delegations, as well as editor-in-chief 
of the journal Cuadernos, the CCF’s Spanish-language 
magazine that received funding from the CIA under the 
cover of the Fairfield Foundation. The publication, very 
well regarded by the Hispanic liberal intelligentsia, was 
an important platform of intellectual and ideological co-
hesion for Spanish anti-Franco intellectuals, the CCF 
headquarters located in Paris and Latin American intel-
lectuals (Ruíz Galbete, 2006; Glondys, 2012, 2017). 
Alongside Gorkin, the Spanish socialists Carlos de Barai-
bar and Carlos P. Carranza acted as representatives of the 
Paris-based Executive Committee, co-directing the local 
groups and designing the program for the Latin American 
centres. Beginning in 1956, Baraibar also became the di-
rector of the CCF Inter-American Office in Santiago de 
Chile, which would enable an exchange of Latin Ameri-
can materials with North America and Canada. It is also 
worth mentioning that the Spanish liberal writer and 
“public intellectual” in exile Salvador de Madariaga was, 
for many years, the only Honorary President of the CCF 
originating from the Hispanic world.
Between 1950-1951, the main goals of the Latin 
American program were established by advisors such as 
Gorkin himself, another POUM ex-member Victor Alba 
and Belgian anarchist Luis Mercier Vega (a former com-
batant in the Spanish Civil War), and concentrated specif-
ically on the liberal and left-wing local intelligentsia with 
the purpose of winning its anti-Soviet and anti-neutralist 
commitment. Yet from the very beginning, the CCF’s 
Latin American program revealed some important ideo-
logical and pragmatic weaknesses. The dominant role of 
the Spanish exiles, both in the local organs and in the edi-
torial team of Cuadernos, aroused suspicion and skepti-
cism among the Latin American intelligentsia. In addi-
tion, the editorial line of Cuadernos was artificially ori-
ented towards European and Spanish problems, and 
denouncement of the violations of Human Rights in Latin 
American dictatorships, as well as discussion about eco-
nomic and social inequalities were notably absent (Fran-
co, 2003: 50-51; Glondys, 2012: 154-157). This deficit in 
addressing the most burning issues of the continent was 
negatively perceived by the local left-wing intelligentsia. 
Another problem was a remarkable lack of confidence of 
the CCF’s executives in the intellectual capacity and po-
litical orientation of the Latin American elites. As a con-
sequence, the axiom of political security became the main 
factor when it came to selecting local collaborators, in ac-
cordance with the CCF’s management structure designed 
around the idea of “democratic centralism”1 by the Exec-
utive Secretary of the CCF and CIA liaison for the organi-
sation, Michael Josselson (Glondys, 2012: 64-66). 
For all these reasons, throughout the 1950s, the organ-
isation failed to overcome a certain “resistance” of Latin 
American elites to its activities, and this bad reception 
was aggravated by the common suspicion that the CCF 
was a US propaganda organization.2 The isolation from 
youth sectors, from left-wing currents and from the liveli-
est debates on culture and Latin American politics in the 
1950s had made it impossible for the CCF to be effective 
when targeting supporters of the Latin American socialist 
“third way”. This situation became evident to the execu-
tives in Paris after the Cuban Revolution, when the very 
limited local support for the organisation became painfully 
obvious. The crisis gave rise to the re-launch of the Latin 
American program and, in the framework of those deep 
transformations, the Spanish exiles were to be progressively 
marginalised and eliminated from the CCF. 
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The mission of redesigning the Latin American pro-
gram in a new continental context following the Cuban 
Revolution was assigned to two special representatives. 
These were the American literary critic Keith Botsford, a 
long-standing personal friend of the CCF executive, CIA 
agent and novelist John Hunt, and Luis Mercier Vega, as 
previously mentioned one of the main driving forces be-
hind the first Latin American program, who on 15th Octo-
ber 1961 replaced Gorkin as head of the Latin American 
Secretariat. Not long after, the lengthy reports and letters 
sent by Botsford and Mercier to Paris made it clear that 
the dominant role of the Spanish exiles in the CCF’s 
structures was proving to be harmful for the organisation. 
Both advisors associated the excessive politicisation of 
the CCF’s local delegations with their leaders’ tendency 
to conduct a constant anti-Communist crusade, to serve 
their own political goals and personal priorities and also 
to violate the CCF’s statutes by linking the organisation 
to the political parties. 
To counter the CCF’s bad reputation as a Cold War 
propaganda organisation, and in order to work with effec-
tiveness among left-wing circles and revolutionary ten-
dencies, a new strategy for penetrating the continent was 
designed. It had to be based on what Josselson called Fi-
delism without Fidel, a new leftist approach to be 
launched in parallel from Cuadernos and from the CCF 
local branches (Coleman, 1989: 193; Iber, 2012: 126-127; 
Glondys, 2012: 129-130). In the new political coordinates 
of the continent, where Cuba and its Casa de las Américas 
was already playing a hegemonic role, the organisation 
needed to explore all existing possibilities for establish-
ing an intellectual dialogue and collaboration with local 
left-wing sectors. Following the “anti-ideological” course 
adopted in the late 50s by the CCF in its contacts with the 
Communist intellectuals of Eastern Europe, the new mo-
dus operandi in Latin America should be -as the CCF’s 
General Secretary Nicolás Nabokov put it- an Apertura a 
Sinistra i.e. an “Opening to the Left.”3 Following that 
new pragmatic approach, the simple anti-Communist 
line was now rejected as not only inadequate but also 
undesirable.4
The need to radically “depoliticise” the CCF’s activi-
ties and establish contacts with young Latin American in-
tellectuals, without excluding the pro-Castroist sectors,5 
meant not only attempting to influence the local Left but 
also getting rid of old collaborators (Glondys, 2012: 168-
183; Iber, 2015: 177-186). With that purpose, Botsford 
and Mercier undertook a broad operation of dismissals in 
local Latin American committees. 
THE DISMISSALS IN URUGUAY, PERU 
AND MExICO (1961-1962)
First dismissals, however, were not due to the political 
aspect of the local CCF branches, but to its bad manage-
ment or lack of activity. This was the case of the Uru-
guayan Committee, created in Montevideo in 1954 and 
supervised by the Spanish exile Francisco Ferrándiz Al-
borz. In September 1960, in a friendly tone, Gorkin in-
formed Ferrándiz Alborz of his dismissal, offering him in 
exchange the possibility of joining the editorial team of 
Cuadernos and offering his help in any way possible.6 
Soon after, in March 1961, Mercier pointed to another 
Spaniard albeit from the younger generation, Benito Mil-
la, as an “éminence grise” in Uruguayan literary circles 
and a reliable man for the CCF’s activity in Uruguay 
(Glondys, 2012: 315-316). Finally, the CCF was to par-
ticipate in the founding of Milla’s ephemeral magazine 
Letras 62 (1962),7 as well as subsidising the magazine Te-
mas (1965-1968), which he also edited. 
Also in Peru, the CCF suffered from a complete lack 
of activity of its local branch. Gorkin’s close friend Luis 
Alberto Sánchez, rector of the National University of San 
Marcos and head of the CCF Peruvian Committee since 
1955, was an example of those well-established liberal 
elites on which the CCF constructed its first program. 
Sanchez who was a leading critic of the Spanish domina-
tion in the CCF, was actually responsible for the fact that 
the Peruvian Committee had been inactive for years and 
its structures had become bloated.8 When Paris decided to 
shut it down, Sánchez, far from exercising any kind of 
self-criticism, adopted an entirely combative attitude and 
in his letter to Gorkin, dated 1st February 1961, made al-
lusions to the CCF’s funding: “it was you who convinced 
me that [the CCF] was not what it has so often been said 
to be”. Sánchez also considered that the CCF had failed 
to show “basic consideration for one of its leading mem-
bers”,9 with that “unusual attitude of dismissing [me] as 
one would a domestic servant”, an issue about which he 
also complained to the director of the CCF Publications 
François Bondy.10 In the bitter correspondence with the 
Paris headquarters after his dismissal, he described the 
CCF’s methods as anti-democratic and even considered 
the way John Hunt had gone about matters as a “certain 
mental totalitarianism.”11 Yet even after he was dismissed, 
Sánchez, who left debts pending from the Committee’s 
operations,12 and who had hired five employees of whose 
presence and obligations the head office in France had 
never been informed,13 continued to request money from 
the CCF to pay his travel expenses.14 In spite of all his 
criticism, Luis Alberto Sánchez would therefore clearly 
continue to benefit from remaining within the CCF’s or-
bit, and although he told Salvador de Madariaga in July 
1965, “I understand that our Congress for Culture is 
foundering. I’m considering resigning from the Commit-
tee for a thousand reasons, including its lack of courtesy”, 
he eventually never did.15 
In the first wave of transformations of the CCF’s local 
branches, the Mexican Association occupies a special po-
sition as a powerful entity with around one hundred mem-
bers in the capital alone, including Juan José Arreola, 
Víctor Alba, Mauricio Gómez Mayorga, Francisco 
Monterde, Carlos A. Echanove, Guadalupe Amor, Felipe 
Cossío del Pomar, Salvador Pineda, Mauricio Magdale-
no, as well as an additional Committee in Puebla. The 
Mexican Committee edited the journals Letras por la 
Libertad (1957) and Examen (1959) (Glondys, 2012: 83; 
Jannello, Summer 2013/2014: 15-16), organised art exhi-
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bitions at the Excélsior Gallery and published pamphlets 
on some highly sensitive issues (for example, Pablo Ne-
ruda or the Boris Pasternak case). Yet, despite its broad 
activity, its supervisor Rodrigo García Treviño, an old 
friend of Gorkin and former collaborator of León Trotsky 
in Mexico, had never enjoyed the trust of Michael Jos-
selson. As early as 1954, Treviño had clashed with the 
Executive Secretary of the CCF when he openly criticised 
the publication in Cuadernos of an article by Eudocio Ra-
vines, who -according to Treviño- had “strong connec-
tions” with the CIA. Josselson, “extremely angry”, 
wrote a letter to Gorkin in which he called Treviño “im-
becile”, adding: “it’s certainly the first time that anyone 
has dared to tell us who can and who can’t write in our 
journals (…)”,16 and ended up suggesting that Treviño 
should be replaced as the head of the Mexican representa-
tion. 
Over time it became clear for the Paris headquarters 
that the Mexican Committee had become a shelter for the 
local anti-Communist right and Treviño’s violent anti-
Communist militancy stood in complete contrast to the 
moderate theory of the “end of ideologies” which pre-
vailed in the CCF during the Peaceful Coexistence. Even 
Gorkin himself had to admit that Treviño had “an exces-
sively militant and closed mentality”, while the CCF’s 
work was about “understanding and solving problems 
and not about propaganda and counter-propaganda.”17 In 
the last attempt to correct the line followed by Treviño, 
Mercier Vega wrote to him a long letter, in which he 
stressed that the Congress for Cultural Freedom was not, 
and could not be, “a contra-Kominform” and what the 
Congress intended to do was to “immunize intellectuals 
against totalitarian gangrene and stimulate them to think 
for themselves” by favoring confrontations and improv-
ing information, as well as encouraging them to assume 
their responsibilities.18 Yet, on his part, in the same month 
of November 1961, Josselson decided it was necessary to 
“free the Congress from Mr. Treviño” and find a way to 
prohibit “this small Mexican McCarthyist” from using 
the name of the organization.19 The transfers to Treviño 
from Paris ended completely in June 1962, given that no 
report had been presented for the previous two years re-
garding the Committee’s accounts, and neither had any 
reply been received to the letters sent by CCF officials.20 
In order to fill the gap left by the closing of the Mexi-
can Committee, Mercier initially accepted the proposal of 
the Spanish exile Manuel Torres Campaña to found the 
group “Friends of Cuadernos”. The idea consisted of re-
launching work in Mexico on the basis of an association 
of liberal Spanish exiles (“España en América”) and later, 
“extending the propaganda of liberal and democratic ten-
dencies of the Congress” beyond the Spanish communi-
ty.21 Torres Campaña insisted once again on the need to 
rely on the Spanish community to conduct the CCF’s 
work (as “European, more dynamic, more suitable”), al-
though he stressed that this was not particularly motivat-
ed by his personal interests: “Long ago the devotion of 
the Spaniards was cleansed of personal ambitions. Like 
Saint John of the Cross, we aspire to higher glories and 
pursue more important aims for the good of America and 
of Spain”.22 
However, Spanish domination in the Latin American 
branch of the CCF was clearly coming to an end. In the 
autumn of 1962, John Hunt instructed Gorkin that Torres 
Campaña should restrict himself only to distributing Cua-
dernos and abstain completely from any tasks of representa-
tion.23 On his part, Josselson expressed his unease with 
Torres Campaña’s efforts as aimed exclusively at “the old 
guard” both among Latin Americans and Spanish exiles, 
concluding that he was simply not “suitable” for the CCF’s 
tasks, which was worsened by the fact he was Spanish.24 
With the mission of promoting “foundations which we can 
build upon in the future”, Keith Botsford himself moved to 
Mexico in 1964, being told by Hunt: “I want you to dig 
deeply and well into Mexican intellectual life and find 
those people and institutions which we can build upon and 
through whom we can work.”25 As the base for his activi-
ties, Botsford used the Mexican Writers’ Centre (“Centro 
Mexicano de Escritores”), fuelled with money from the 
CIA, and the team from the Revista Mexicana de Literatu-
ra (Jannello, Summer 2013/2014: 93-94; Iber, 2015: 186-
189). He would soon observe a conflict between Mexicans 
and Spaniards in all sectors of Mexican cultural society, 
which, in Botsford’s opinion, was the result of the “nar-
row-minded nationalism” of the local elites.26 
The dismissal of Luis Alberto Sánchez, a relevant 
member of that liberal intelligentsia upon which the CCF 
had built most of its local support, and the fall from grace 
of Treviño, due to his excessively anti-Communist orien-
tation, provided paradigmatic examples of the kind of 
opening which the CCF was pursuing in the continent: to 
Latin American youth and left-wing sectors. Yet the trans-
formations of the Latin American program aroused protests 
and criticism not only among those who were the direct 
victims of the new course, but also among their staunchest 
defenders: the Spanish exiles. The biggest controversy 
surrounding the “Apertura a Sinistra” strategy involved 
the CCF’s Honorary President Salvador de Madariaga, 
who decided to personally intervene before the CCF’s 
executives in relation to the closing of the Brazilian 
committee. 
SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA AND THE 
CONTROVERSY ARISING FROM 
THE “APERTURA A SINISTRA” 
From 18th to 26th September 1956, the CCF organ-
ised a major Inter-American Conference in Mexico, 
which served as an impetus for founding the Brazilian 
Committee, coordinated by a Rumanian exile couple 
Mira and Stefan Baciu, who were soon to edit the maga-
zine Cadernos Brasileiros (1959-1970) (Vanden Berghe, 
1997). The Mexico Conference served to strengthen 
bonds with Latin American intellectuals, but it also pro-
vided them with the opportunity to establish contacts and 
alliances under the auspices of the CCF, an aspect for 
which the Ecuadorian Benjamín Carrión thanked Gorkin 
after the meeting in the following terms: 
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Even you yourself cannot imagine the extent of the ser-
vice you have provided and continue to provide to uni-
versal culture, especially to continental American cul-
ture. People who meet each other, relationships which 
are established, fertile reencounters: you, friend Julián 
Gorkin, have done what few people, perhaps nobody, has 
done for the solidarity of culture and for its freedom.27 
Without doubt, Gorkin’s management encountered 
strong support on the continent among the sectors that di-
rectly benefited from the CCF’s activity, but this would 
soon prove to be insufficient. As in Mexico and Peru, or-
ganised according to the priorities of the Spanish exiles, 
the reputation of the Brazilian Committee was clearly that 
of a right-wing organisation. In the spring of 1961, Mer-
cier pointed out the need to radically depoliticise the local 
Committee and fill its ranks with young people.28 After 
Keith Botsford’s controversial management, which 
caused an open conflict with the Bacius, in Spring 1962 
Hunt personally undertook efforts to make the Rumanian 
couple understand that the CCF “is not purely an organi-
sation which has assumed the sole task of systematically 
fighting against Communism”. Therefore, what also 
should be done was to stimulate a vast, frank and free in-
tellectual and ideological debate in Brazil and search for a 
positive program for the country.29 Hunt even travelled 
personally to Brazil in an attempt to alleviate the conflict, 
but his position was perceived by the Bacius as crypto-
Communist. 
A serious difficulty to find appropriate substitutes for 
the Bacius30 led to further interventions on the part of the 
CCF’s executives in a desperate attempt to save the situa-
tion. A special role was played by Nicolás Nabokov who 
tried to calm tensions and reorient the CCF’s activity in 
Brazil in a long and very important letter written in April 
1962 to Stefan Baciu: 
I think you should trust the judgement of those here in 
the Central [sic] Secretariat. The Congress is not, and 
should not be, an organisation fighting the “cold war” 
and should not be perceived as such. This, I believe, is a 
fundamental fact and is perhaps, if I may say so, the 
point you have failed to understand. We are a very het-
erogeneous organisation and the active members of our 
Executive Committee are becoming increasingly aware 
that the strategy the Congress should adopt in this 
changing world needs to be varied and very flexible. 
Above all, I feel that, while often adopting firm posi-
tions regarding different aspects of totalitarianism, we 
should not charge at all the problems it poses like an 
angry bull. Our work calls for us, most importantly, to 
win friends and to win them in what is now referred to 
in Italy as the “Opening to the Left”. I must confess that 
when I was in São Paulo and when I spoke to different 
people in Rio de Janeiro and Bahia, I was astonished to 
see that in certain circles, not in the least Communist 
[underlying sic], the Congress is seen as a right-wing 
American organisation whose only mission is the open, 
militant fight against Communism. I found this depress-
ing and still do, as it limits our opportunities to work 
positively in defense of intellectual freedom and win the 
sympathy and support of non-Communist left-wing cir-
cles via free discussion and persuasion. I think that Bra-
zil is one of those countries where the intellectual cli-
mate obliges us to adopt this flexible position and 
concern ourselves with what are essentially Brazilian 
problems, “depoliticise” many of our activities and 
maximise the possibility of dialogue with those on the 
left, as Silone does in Italy and as we try to do through 
the mediation of our friends in Poland and Yugoslavia.31 
To better illustrate his thesis, Nabokov went on to 
quote a confidential internal CCF document, written by 
Edward Shils, which described the CCF as an organisation 
of post-ideological influence, whose principal objective, 
rather than fighting against Communism, should be at-
tracting Communists and their fellow travellers and sym-
pathisers into a dialogue, into an “understanding” (“en-
tente”), which was the “objective and the instrument of 
our activities.”32 The new main goal was to discover com-
mon ground between the CCF’s community and Commu-
nist intellectuals and establish relations within the frame-
work of an open debate, about which Nabokov added: 
If we do not agree, it does not matter. (...) I believe that 
in view of the immense misery of our time we must try 
all the options available to us, especially those appeal-
ing to people’s spiritual and emotional ability to under-
stand complicated situations, and not fall back on the 
outmoded slogans of what is known in English as “prof-
it-less partisanship”.33
Predictably, for the Bacius, the ideological transfor-
mations taking place in the CCF were endangering its ba-
sic ideals. As a consequence, on 2nd August 1962, the 
Romanian couple sent a telegram with their resignation to 
Nabokov, stating that they had been victims of “humilia-
tion, unfairness and slander”, and in protest at the “terror” 
exercised by Botsford and his methods, which, in their 
view, were at odds with the defence of cultural freedom.34 
Warned by Baciu that the CCF’s new political line in 
Latin America would no longer have anything to do with 
anti-Communism35 and very concerned about the gradual 
dismantling of the original structures and by the “Open-
ing to the Left”, Salvador de Madariaga decided to inter-
vene in defence of those marginalised or dismissed on 
behalf of the new strategy. In his role as Honorary Presi-
dent, he officially protested to Michael Josselson about 
the CCF’s new ideological line, which he considered 
“radically different from that which has been followed up 
until now.”36 In his replies, Josselson stated that there 
were no grounds for interpreting the CCF’s transforma-
tion “as a change of direction regarding the fundamental 
question”, but rather that it was a purely tactical change. 
Josselson also defended the strategy of “opening” with 
the idea that “an open society” was better prepared to 
counter the perils represented by the communism that a 
“closed one.”37 On 26th of October 1962, Josselson asked 
explicitly for Madariaga’s trust in his leadership in the 
CCF’s affairs and defended the “Apertura a Sinistra” as a 
strategy meant to influence the people the CCF aimed to 
influence (and not talking to the already convinced…).38
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Yet Josselson’s arguments proved useless to counter 
the rumours that fed Madariaga’s suspicions, and as a re-
sult of his increasing dissent, the Spaniard himself would 
also ultimately be ousted from the new Latin American 
program and his collaboration in Cuadernos (in 1962 Ma-
dariaga’s articles were vetoed by Josselson and Nabokov 
on at least two occasions) (Glondys, 2012: 172-176) . As 
for the Brazilian Committee, its presidency would even-
tually be assumed by Baciu’s former collaborator, Alfaro 
Coutinho, and its general secretariat by Vicente Barretto. 
Nevertheless, none of those transformations would im-
prove the CCF’s situation in Brazil and the rest of the 
continent. Not long afterwards, a new wave of attacks 
was unleashed against CCF circles as a result of the 
“Apertura a Sinistra”, this time not promoted by the 
Cuban Regime, but by Baciu, Treviño and their fellow 
travelers now actively spreading accusations that the CCF 
was acting on Communist inspiration. 
CARLOS P. CARRANzA AND CARLOS 
BARAIBAR: THE LAST DISMISSALS
The last bastions of Spanish influence in the local 
CCF structures corresponded to the Argentinian and Chil-
ean Committees. The former was set up after the fall of 
Perón, during Gorkin and Luis Alberto Sánchez’s trip to 
Buenos Aires at the end of 1955,39 and its honorary presi-
dents were Bernardo Houssay and Alfredo L. Palacios; 
the president of its Executive Committee, Roberto F. 
Gius ti; its vice-presidents, Victoria Ocampo and Francisco 
Romero, its general secretary, Juan A. Solari, and its sec-
retary of relations, Guillermo de Torre. Its many members 
included the writer Ernesto Sábato. The delegate of the 
CCF Executive Committee Carlos P. Carranza acted as 
the supervisor of the Argentinian local structures. Al-
though Josselson himself praised the work of the Argen-
tinian Committee in early 1961 (“He even said to me that 
I deserve the Legion of Honour of the Congress for Cul-
tural Freedom”,40 Carranza told Gorkin), at around that 
same time Mercier already suggested downgrading Car-
ranza’s role to that of administrator. Furthermore, on 6th 
July 1961 Josselson considered that the tour undertaken 
by Carranza for the purpose of attracting more subscribers 
to Cuadernos had been a failure, which added to the high-
ly disappointing results obtained in the period following 
the transformation of the magazine into a monthly publi-
cation. Visibly angry, Josselson insisted that the campaign 
to increase subscriptions had to be carried out from then 
on by the “l’Avenue de l’Opera team” i.e. Iglesias, Baeza 
Flores and Guilbert.41 
In 1962, Mercier warned the CCF’s executives that 
the Argentinian Committee signified nothing in the intel-
lectual life of the country, with its reputation of an anti-
Communist organisation filled with members subservient 
to militaristic-nationalistic tendencies and completely 
closed to left-wing sectors and to young people.42 It was 
necessary to counteract that “awful reputation” in the 
country’s intellectual circles and also to regain control of 
the series “Biblioteca de Libertad”, whose recent works 
were “reactionary in spirit and intellectually mediocre”.43 
For example, according to Mercier, the book La garra co-
munista en América Latina by Pedro de Basaldúa, pub-
lished in 1962, was just the kind of work that the CCF 
should never have published, given that it consisted of 
“more or less debatable information on the Communist 
danger in Latin America, with a preface written by a per-
son known for his socially conservative ideas.”44 In the 
letter dated 16th April 1963, Mercier stated to Iglesias, 
concerning the same editorial series: 
The latest stupidity which I discovered recently is that 
of Gilberto Freyre’s prologue to Strachey’s pamphlet. 
This prologue, which practically compromises the Con-
gress, is nothing less than a defence of the methods of 
Portuguese colonisation and the present-day policies of 
Salazar. Coming after Carranza’s pamphlet about agrar-
ian reform and Dussault’s little book on university re-
form, I think we have reached the peak of idiocy.45 
Moreover, it can be deduced from Mercier’s corre-
spondence that Carranza had also taken advantage of his 
position in the CCF to enrich himself personally.46 The 
decision to dismiss him was taken in the spring of 1963. 
In May, Mercier confirmed his view of the Argentinian 
Association as a “foyer” for “right-wing democratic ele-
ments of the old generations”; even Solari acknowledged 
that the Committee was not working well and Guillermo 
de Torre considered it “a failure.”47 Finally, in June 1963, 
the Sur team took over the distribution of Cuadernos in 
Argentina and Óscar Serrat assumed the administrative 
side. Careful in his criticism of Solari and Carranza, in a 
personal letter announcing their dismissal, Mercier point-
ed to the “generational debilitation” and the distancing of 
the Sur group as well as major figures such as Jorge Luis 
Borges and Bernardo Houssay.48 On 30th December 
1963, Carranza received a letter from Hunt thanking him 
for his work,49 and this marked the beginning of the inci-
dent-ridden process which, in the face of Carranza’s re-
fusal to hand over the premises, went as far as forcing the 
new team to change the locks (Glondys, 2012: 173). In 
the end, the leadership of the new Argentinian Committee 
was to be as follows: Horacio Rodríguez as general secre-
tary; Óscar Serrat, administrator; and Héctor Murena, in 
charge of Fine Arts and Literature. It was agreed that the 
Argentinian centre would initially receive 5,000 dollars 
every quarter, although by November 1964, the amount 
had risen to 30,000 annually.
The Chilean Committee was established as early as 
July 1953, with sections in Valparaíso and Concepción. 
After the resignation of George Nicolai, its first president, 
the tasks of representation fell to Carlos de Baraibar, the 
representative of the CCF Executive Committee in Chile, 
known in Paris for systematically calling for proper re-
muneration for the work done in the continent (Glondys, 
2012: 309). The Chilean Committee had two vice-presi-
dents, Ramón Cortez and the poet Julio Barrenechea 
-who was also a member of the General Assembly of the 
CCF in 1956-, two secretaries, Alejandro Magnet and 
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Pedro Guglielmetti, and its members included Jaime Cas-
tillo, Miguel Bravo, Chela Reyes, Amanda Labarca and 
André Germain. 
According to a report written by Mercier in March 
1961, it was the only Committee which functioned well. 
Yet already one year later, in his correspondence with 
Paris, Botsford mocked Baraibar and his collaborator 
Germain as “a pair of pessimistic gentlemen”, who felt 
“surrounded by sinister forces” (referring to Salvador 
Allende’s growing political strength).50 Very soon, in the 
context of the new prerogatives resulting from the “Open-
ing to the Left”, Michael Josselson himself assumed the 
task of persuading Baraibar to follow the new policy of 
ideological relaxation and sent him a letter, full of irony, 
the most significant part of which stated: 
The most terrible thing about all of that is that if Chile 
really does fall into the Communist abyss, it wouldn’t 
be due to the attractiveness of Communism or Castro-
ism per se, but because of the tardiness in your country 
when it came to thinking about the need for agrarian and 
fiscal reforms. I sometimes ask myself if, instead of in-
vesting so much energy in the fight against the Commu-
nist Party and its fellow travellers, our Committees in 
Latin America shouldn’t have attacked with greater 
vigour the feudal and other forces which have for so long 
opposed economic and social reforms of any kind.51
However, the CCF could not reasonably expect that 
anti-Communism as a political line would be readily 
abandoned by those old Europeans who, in the decades of 
exile following their defeat in the Spanish Civil War, ded-
icated all their efforts to fight against the Soviet Commu-
nism. Faced with Baraibar’s inflexibility, as early as 
September 1963 Josselson came to the conclusion that all 
“those Baraibars, Treviños, Bacius, etc., have the same 
worth”52 and on 28th December Mercier officially in-
formed Baraibar of his dismissal. The main pretext was 
that he continued to publish under the CCF logo propa-
ganda leaflets with texts issued by embassy services or 
combat associations53 and carried on with other political 
activities that were contrary to the CCF’s statutes. Also 
the desire, previously expressed by Baraibar, to retire 
from active life in Chile, together with Germain’s health 
problems, provided ideal arguments for dismissing both. 
The economic effects of this dismissal were alleviated, in 
Baraibar’s case, by the granting of a two-year scholarship 
for the preparation of a book, and with a financial com-
pensation for Germain. Despite Baraibar’s appalling rep-
utation in Chile,54 it was important to do as much as pos-
sible to maintain good relations with these two “excellent 
friends”, as John Hunt stated to Luis Mercier.55 In the end, 
Juan Holenderski was named administrator of the new 
Chilean branch; Miguel Arteche responsible for the gen-
eral contents; and Víctor Carvacho for the Fine Arts pro-
gram.56 
The CCF still had to face a group solidarity of the 
members of the Chilean Committee who defended Barai-
bar and Germain through Amanda Labarca in a letter sent 
to Paris signed by all of them.57 Among the Spanish ex-
iles, a role of their principal defender corresponded to 
Salvador de Madariaga, who on 9th August 1964, in a new 
letter to Hunt, protested about the dismissals and, with re-
gard to the “Apertura a Sinistra”, stressed what follows: 
Concrete data which have come to me from my friends 
in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile lead me to think 
that in actual fact if not in the theory or even the wish of 
the leadership of our Congress, this Apertura a sinistra 
is far reaching enough to go beyond Ibero-American 
Nennis so as to include Ibero-American Togliattis. This 
in itself is serious enough. As a result, friends whose 
services to our Congress are invaluable, men such as 
Carranza, Baraibar and Solari, are either leaving or be-
ing dropped. This disquiets me considerably, not for the 
sake of those men themselves but for the sake of our 
Congress, since such a waste of human material can but 
have most deplorable effects in public opinion over-
seas.58 
Madariaga’s conviction that the CCF started to in-
clude “down-right Communists” coincided fully with the 
radical idea taken by Rodrigo García Treviño and the 
French socialist Suzanne Labin, who considered the CCF, 
by that stage, as an organisation infiltrated by the Soviets. 
Even Gorkin himself informed Madariaga of his sup-
posed doubts as to whether or not to abandon the CCF59 
and of his concerns about the new orientation which 
“many people consider to be in line with popular front 
thinking.”60 In fact, like other Spaniards, also Gorkin had 
been increasingly marginalised in the Congress -in 
1961, he was replaced by Mercier Vega in the Latin 
American Secretariat; and in January 1963, as Cuadernos 
editor, by the Colombian intellectual and diplomat Ger-
mán Arciniegas (Glondys, 2012: 175). Also, after his 
gradual elimination from the Latin American structures, 
all the help provided by the CCF for his political projects 
geared towards Spain came to an end in Autumn of 1966, 
and only the Iberian program run by the French poet 
Pierre Emmanuel was maintained (Glondys, 2012: 258-
260; Glondys, 2014). Significantly, after Cuadernos’ 
steady decline and its closure in 1965, an anthology of its 
best texts was published and an initially planned section 
called “Spain and the Spaniards” was eliminated on the 
personal decision of Michael Josselson.
Satisfied at having successfully eliminated the undesir-
able collaborators, in April 1964 John Hunt wrote to Mer-
cier about the imperative need to launch in Latin America 
a new political activity on the part of the CCF, which now 
should be carried out in an appropriate manner: 
I should like to emphasize the fact (…) that our new 
groups and representatives in Latin America should 
continue to give a certain portion of their attention and 
effort to the international scene in keeping with the in-
ternational character of the political and cultural aim of 
the Congress. We have certainly succeeded in putting 
the accent where it belongs, namely on local problems 
of particular interest to local intellectuals, but we should 
not get so wholly submerged in local questions that we 
forget the larger ideological and political issues which 
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are at the heart of the Congress as an international 
movement. In addition to the long range of activities 
upon which we have now embarked, surely some of our 
activities must be designed for the short run with the 
idea of doing all possible to resist totalitarian solutions 
in Latin America. In short, what I am wondering about 
is the political profile of our Latin American work now 
that we have addressed ourselves largely to local prob-
lems.61
The extract quoted shows that Hunt considered con-
tinuing the work of political influence to be necessary and 
unavoidable in order to prevent the political extremism, 
or in his own words, to “resist totalitarian solutions in 
Latin America”. Therefore, the main reason for the dis-
missals of the old collaborators was not the politicisation 
of the CCF’s local branches itself, but rather that this po-
liticisation was inadequate from the point of view of Par-
is, because its radical anti-Communist tone was ineffec-
tive for the strategy of influence carried out in the 
concrete political landscape after the Cuban Revolution. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has focused on a personal dimension of the 
decline of the CCF’s first Latin American program, which 
to large extent was designed and implemented by a group 
of Spanish exiles. In the early 1950s, the CCF would ben-
efit greatly from the experience of the Spaniards in the 
ideological struggle, their political reliability based on 
unwavering anti-Communism and, finally, their symbolic 
significance as the incarnation of anti-Fascist ideas 
(Glondys, 2012: 76-78). However, they became progres-
sively problematic for the CCF’s purposes in a new con-
text after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution. Obsessed 
with the relentless fight against Communism, the Spanish 
exiles proved to be ineffective when choosing suitable lo-
cal collaborators, while interacting with supporters of the 
“third way” and offering a positive, ambitious and long-
term program for the Latin American Left and especially 
for its youth. Furthermore, with the passing of the years, 
and as a consequence of the emergence of new local 
elites, the presence of the Spaniards in the main Latin 
American centres of cultural and intellectual life gave rise 
to ever increasing conflict and rivalry with the autochtho-
nous sectors, fanned by local nationalist and anti-imperi-
alist currents. Finally, an evident deterioration of the rela-
tionship between the Spanish contributors and the CCF’s 
executives took place when the CCF assumed its new 
strategy of “Apertura a Sinistra” at the beginning of the 
1960s.
One of the conclusions of this study is that the Inter-
national Secretariat found it difficult to control local sec-
tions in developing countries, which were far removed 
from Paris. In spite of the fact that the formula of “demo-
cratic centralism” became the maxim around which Jos-
selson sought to organise the international work of the 
CCF, in the case of Latin America that tactic proved very 
difficult to apply. This was mainly because communica-
tion between Latin American intellectual circles and the 
head office in Paris was carried out by Spanish exiles and 
local liberal elites, who did not hesitate to misinform 
about the real results of their work on the continent -for 
which they got paid- or to use the CCF mainly to further 
their own political agendas. That situation became unsus-
tainable after the Cuban Revolution, when the CCF’s po-
sition on the continent clearly emerged as isolated and 
weak. This was also the time at which the attitude of the 
CCF’s leaders towards the Latin American contributors 
became painfully pragmatic. The individual priorities of 
the Spanish and the Latin American intellectuals in charge 
of the local representations proved irrelevant as soon as 
they clashed with the general interests of the organisation. 
In fact, the dismissals in Latin America recall a similar 
episode in the history of the Congress when, after the 
founding conference in Berlin in 1950, the entire right 
wing of the nascent organisation, pertaining to the Ameri-
can Committee for Cultural Freedom, was marginalised. 
Ex-Communists who were founding intellectuals of the 
CCF, such as James Burnham and Arthur Koestler, were 
at that time rejected in the context of the emerging strate-
gy of the CCF, which consisted of basing its philosophy 
of action on the ideology of the non-Communist left 
(Coleman, 1989: 34; Grémion, 1995: 50; Saunders, 2001: 
144). 
The changing ideological line adopted by the CCF in 
Latin America reveals the CCF as a versatile organisation 
which did not have just a single, permanent strategy, but 
rather that it chose to adapt it according to the changing 
political context. In the Latin American case, the CCF’s 
shift to the left was a pragmatic decision aimed at attract-
ing intellectuals who sympathised with Castroism. Direct 
attack was replaced by an attitude of dialogue and per-
sonal contacts, with the aim of creating the possibility of 
a rational, “not political” debate. Yet, at the same time, 
this change of strategy -from attack to debate- in dealing 
with Communism and Castroism aroused suspicion and 
controversy among fundamental collaborators which 
proved impossible to overcome. Moreover the new CCF’s 
delegations turned out to be unable to fulfil the hopes that 
had been placed in them, and the CCF had to face a wide-
spread smear campaign unleashed by those who had been 
dismissed. Relevant ex contributors such as Sánchez, 
Treviño or Gorkin were convinced that the CCF, once 
funded to “help democratic intellectuals”, now “has 
turned into a den where Communists are treated like nice 
girls”62 (Glondys, 2017: 199-200). 
We cannot exclude the possibility that the operation of 
dismissals, carried out against Gorkin’s judgement and of 
which he was also a casualty, may have annoyed some 
influential sectors in the US with which he maintained ex-
cellent contacts. What the victims of the dismissals inter-
preted as a shift on the part of the Congress towards pro-
Communist positions may easily have been interpreted in 
the same way by certain sectors of the United States es-
tablishment, who had been opposed to the CCF’s left-
wing strategy for many years (Wilford, 2006: 198-200). 
Indeed, Saunders (2001: 545-566) and Wilford (2008: 
Culture & History Digital Journal 7(1), June 2018, e010. eISSN 2253-797X, https://doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2018.010
Dismissals of the Congress for Cultural Freedom’s representatives in Latin America as part of the strategy… • 9
206) have pointed to the hypothesis that, in 1967, it was 
in reality the CIA itself that allowed the CCF to fall, along 
with other covertly financed organisations, because of the 
increasing discomfort with the financing of left-wing in-
tellectuals and activists. We should therefore not exclude 
the possibility that the unease caused by the wave of dis-
missals in Latin America and the alleged opening of the 
CCF to Castroist sympathisers was one of the final straws 
for the CCF’s sponsors, who were probably unhappy with 
the excessively left-wing policies pursued by the organi-
sation after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution.63 
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